Franklin Repository

We have before us the official report of Gen. Lee, giving the detailed account of his disastrous campaign in Pennsylvania. The readers of the Repository have already had in these columns everything pertaining to that movement from loyal sources, that could be interesting or instructive, but the account given by the rebel Commander-in-Chief throws new light upon the purposes, plans and events of that campaign, which are necessary to a perfect understanding of the grand combinations conceived and the terrible disaster realized by the foes of the Republic.

Gen. Lee left his position on the Rappahannock because the lines of Hooker were such as "could not be attacked to advantage," and he therefore determined to draw Hooker from his defences. He adds--"The execution of this purpose embraced the relief of the Shenandoah Valley from the troops that had occupied the lower part of it during the winter and spring, and, if practicable, the transfer of the scene of hostilities north of the Potomac." He hoped that the movement of Hooker in pursuit of the rebels might afford an opportunity to "strike a blow" at the Union army; that Hooker would certainly be "compelled to leave Virginia, and possibly draw to his support troops designed to operate against other parts of the country." He adds--"In this way it was supposed that the enemy's plan of campaign for the summer would be broken up, and part of the season of active operations be consumed in the formation of new combinations and the preparations that they would require." These considerations, strengthened by the hope "that other valuable results might be attended by military success," give us the purpose of Lee in his aggressive movement.

He recites the movements of the different corps of his army with minuteness. The forward movement began on the 3d of June, just one month before the terrible repulse he met with at Gettysburg. On that day McLaw's division left Fredericksburg for Culpepper, and Hood's division started from the Rapidan for the same point at the same time. They were followed on the 4th and 5th, where they were joined by Gen. Stuart with his cavalry. Gen. Jenkins was then thrown forward toward Winchester, and Imboden was directed to move toward Romney, to cover the movement against Winchester and prevent reinforcements by the Baltimore and Ohio road. Gen. Rodes then advanced upon Berryville to cut off Milroy's communication with the Potomac, and Gen. Ewell with Early's and Johnson's divisions moved directly against Winchester. The result of these movements are well known. On the 14th Gen. Ewell carried Milroy's outer works, dispersed and captured most of his army, guns and stores and entered Winchester, and on the same day Gen. Rodes entered Martinsburg. These operations gave the rebels undispused [sic] possession of the Shenandoah Valley, and Lee claims 4,000 prisoners, 29 guns, 70 wagons and ambulances and 400 horses as the trophies of his victors.

On the night of the 14th, the same day Ewell entered Winchester, the Union army left its position on the Rappahannock and commenced the pursuit. Then the rebels had eleven days' start of Hooker, and held the entire Shenandoah, with all the mountain gaps clean down to the Potomac, before he moved against them. He then had no chance to offer battle South of the Potomac except at great disadvantage, and he sensibly declined to do so. Lee says that no "favorable opportunity was presented to attack" Hooker in his march, as he kept the roads close to the Potomac, and "the transfer of the scene of hostilities North of the Potomac" became a necessity for Lee, for he could not remain idle with is whole army in the Shenandoah, so far from his base of supplies. Gen. Jenkins was then ordered into Pennsylvania, and penetrated as far as Chambersburg, but as this did not have the effect of drawing Hooker from Virginia, and failed also in compelling him to attack Lee in his chosen position, a movement in force into Maryland and Pennsylvania became the only alternative remaining for Lee. On the 24th Longstreet and Hill marched to the Potomac, and the former crossed at Williamsport and the latter at Shepperdstown. These columns were united at Hagerstown and advanced into Pennsylvania, reaching Chambersburg on the 27th. Lee thus explains his position and plans after reaching this place:

"No report had been received that the Federal army had crossed the Potomac, and the absence of the cavalry rendered it impossible to obtain accurate information. In order, however, to retain it on the east side of the mountains after it should enter Maryland, and thus leave open our communication with the Potomac, through Hagerstown and Williamsport, Gen. Ewell had been instructed to send a division eastward from Chambersburg to cross the South Mountains. Early's division was detached for the purpose , and proceeded as far east as York while the remainder of the corps proceeded to Carlisle.

"Gen. Imboden, in pursuance of instructions previously referred to, had been actively engaged on the left of Gen. Ewell during the progress of the latter into Maryland. He had driven off the forces guarding the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, destroyed all the important bridges on the route from Cumberland to Martinsburg, and seriously damaged the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal.

"He subsequently took position at Hancock, and after the arrival of Longstreet and Hill at Chambersburg was directed to march by way of M'Connellsburg to that place."

There has been much conjecture as to the reasons which actuated the rebel commander in failing to attack Harrisburg. It is well known that Gen. Ewell's corps was all north of this place, and that he had an ample force to assault the raw troops and rude fortifications improvised for the defense of the capitol. It is clear now, however, that the exhausting efforts made by Gen. Couch to save our capitol, with most inadequate means, resulted in so delaying the rebel march that they were called to Gettysburg before they felt entirely safe in making the attack. Gen. Lee says:

"Preparations were now made to advance upon Harrisburg, but on the night of the 29th information was received from a scout that the Federal army, having crossed the Potomac, was advancing northwards, and that the head of the column had reached the South Mountain. As our communications with the Potomac were thus menaced, it was resolved to prevent his further progress in that direction by concentrating our army on the east side of the mountains. Accordingly, Longstreet and Hill were directed to proceed from Chambersburg to Gettysburg, to which point Gen. Ewell was also instructed to march from Carlisle."

It will be seen that the capture of Harrisburg and the destruction of the important bridges on the Susquehanna, were embraced in the rebel programme. They were saved only by the militia and fortifications retarding Ewell's movements until Meade threatened Lee's communications and required Lee to recall Ewell and concentrate his army. Lee's army was now drawn together with wonderful rapidity. Gen. Stuart crossed the Potomac at Seneca, and marched by Westminster to Carlisle, where he found that Ewell had already fallen back, and he hastened to join Lee at Gettysburg. Indeed Lee's whole army was on the battle ground by the evening of the 2d of July, but Imboden's command, which passed through Chambersburg on the evening of the 3d and joined Lee just in time to find him utterly defeated and retreating. We give the account of the battle in Gen. Lee's own language:

"The march toward Gettysburg was conducted more slowly than it would have been had the movements of the Federal army been known.

The leading division of Hill met the enemy in advance at Gettysburg, on the morning of the 1st of July. Driving back the troops to within a short distance of the town, he there encountered a large force with which two of his divisions became entangled. Ewell coming up with two of his divisions on the Heidlersburg road, joined in the engagement. The enemy was driven through Gettysburg with much loss, including about five thousand prisoners and several pieces of artillery.

We retreated to a high range of hills south and east of the town. The attack was not pressed that afternoon, the enemy's force being unknown, and it being considered advisable to await the arrival of the rest of our troops. Orders were went back to hasten their march; and, in the meantime, every effort was made to ascertain the numbers and position of the enemy, and find the most favorable point of attack. It had not been intended to fight a general battle at such a distance from our base, unless attacked by the enemy: but, finding ourselves unexpectedly confronted by the Federal army, it became a matter of difficulty to withdraw through the mountains with our large trains. At the same time the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies while the presence of the enemy's main body, as he was enabled to restrain our foraging parties by occupying the passes of the mountains with regular [illegible]. A battle thus became, in a measure, unavoidable. Encouraged by the successful issue of the engagement on the first day, and in view of the valuable results that would ensue from the defeat of the army of Gen. Meade, it was thought advisable to renew the attack.

"The preparations for attack were not completed until the afternoon of the 2d.

"The enemy held a high and commanding ridge, along which he had massed a large amount of artillery. Gen. Ewell occupied the left of our line, Gen. Hill the centre, and Gen. Longstreet the right. In front of Gen. Longstreet the enemy held a position, from which, if he could be driven, it was thought that our army could be used to advantage in assailing the more elevated ground beyond, and thus enable us to reach the crest of the ridge. That officer was directed to endeavor to carry this position while Gen. Ewell attacked directly the high ground on the enemy's right, which had already been partially fortified. Gen. Hill was instructed to threaten the centre of the Federal line, in order to prevent reinforcements being sent to either wing, and to avail himself of any opportunity that might present itself to attack.

"After a severe struggle Longstreet succeeded in getting possession of and holding the desired ground. Ewell also carried some of the strong positions which he assailed, and the result was such as to lead to the belief that he would ultimately be able to dislodge the enemy. The battle ceased at dark.

"These partial successes determined me to continue the assault next day. Pickett, with three of his brigades, joined Longstreet the following morning, and our batteries were moved forward to the position gained by him the day before.

"The general plan of attack was unchanged, except that one division and two brigades of Hill's corps were ordered to support Longstreet.

"The enemy, in the meantime, had strengthened his line with earthworks. The morning was occupied in necessary preparations, and the battle recommenced in the afternoon of the 3d. and raged with great violence until sunset. Our troops succeeded in entering the advanced works of the enemy, and getting possession of some of his batteries; but our artillery having nearly expended its ammunition, the attacking columns became exposed to the heavy fire of the numerous batteries near the summit of the ridge, and, after a most determined and gallant struggle, were compelled to relinquish their advantage, and fall back to their original position, with severe loss."

The report then compliments the conduct of his troops, and justly adds that "they deserved success so far as it can be deserved by heroic valor and fortitude." It cannot be doubted that the rebel army fought at Gettysburg with a degree of courage worthy of the best cause; but they were met with equal valor by the gallant Army of the Potomac, and finally had to abandon their assaults in despair, with one-third of their men killed, wounded and prisoners. Lee finding all his assaults to be fruitless save in their rich harvest of death, resolved to retreat. He says:

"Owing to the strength of the enemy's position and the reduction of our ammunition, a renewal of the engagement could not be hazarded, and the difficulty of procuring supplies rendered it impossible to continue longer where we were. Such of the wounded as were in condition to be removed, and part of the arms collected on the field, were ordered to Williamsport. The army remained at Gettysburg during the 4th and at night began to retire by the road to Fairfield, carrying with it about 4,000 prisoners.

"Little progress was made that night, owing to a severe storm, which greatly embarrassed our movements. The rear of the column did not leave its position near Gettysburg until after daylight on the 5th.

"The march was continued during that day without interruption by the enemy, except an unimportant demonstration upon our rear in the afternoon, when near Fairfield, which was easily checked. Part of our trains moved by the road through Fairfield, and the rest by the way of Cashtown, guarded by Gen. Imboden. In passing through the mountains in advance of the column, the great length of the trains exposed them to attack by the enemy's cavalry, which captured a number of wagons and ambulances; but they succeeded in reaching Williamsport without serious loss.

"The army, after an arduous march, rendered more difficult by the rains, reached Hagerstown on the afternoon of the 6th and morning of the 7th of July.

"The Potomac was found to be so much swollen by the rains that had fallen almost incessantly since our entrance into Maryland as to be unfordable. Our communications with the south side were thus interrupted, and it was difficult to procure the ammunition or subsistence, the latter difficulty being enhanced by the high waters impeding the working of the neighboring mills. The trains with the wounded and prisoners were compelled to await at Williamsport the subsiding of the river and the construction of boats, as the pontoon bridge left at Falling Waters had been partially destroyed. The enemy had not yet made his appearance but, as he was in condition to obtain large reinforcements and our situation, for the reasons above mentioned was becoming daily more embarrassing, it was deemed advisable to recross the river. Part of the pontoon bridge was recovered, and new boats built so that by the 13th a good bridge was thrown over the river at Falling Water.

"The enemy in force reached our front on the 12th. A position had been previously selected to cover the Potomac from Williamsport to Falling Waters, and an attack was awaited during that and the succeeding day. This did not take place, though the two armies were in close proximity, the enemy being occupied in fortifying his own lines. Our preparations being completed, and the river though still deep, being pronounced fordable, the army commenced to withdraw to the south side on the night of the 13th.

"Ewell's corps forded the river at Williamsport, those of Longstreet and hill crossed upon the bridge. Owing tot he condition of the roads the troops did not reach the bridge until after daylight on the 14th, and the crossing was not completed until 1 P.M., when the bridge was removed.

"During the slow and tedious march to the bridge in the midst of a violent storm of rain, some of the men lay down by the way to rest. Officers sent back for them failed to find many in the obscurity of the night, and these, with some stragglers, fell into the hands of the enemy."

We see nothing in this report that throws any new light upon the real aspect of affairs between the two armies when confronting each other at Williamsport. It is evident that Lee expected to be attacked by Meade before he re-crossed the Potomac, and was as well prepared for it as possible; but we must infer from his own account of it, that he was not in condition to await an attack as a matter of choice. On the contrary he escaped across the Potomac as soon as it was pronounced fordable. He does not say whether he had received a fresh supply of ammunition, but we doubt not that he did as soon as it was possible to get anything across the river.

What Lee's purpose was when he re-crossed the Potomac is not made known, but from the following paragraph he intimates that he had further aggressive movements in view. He says:

"Owing to the swollen condition of the Shenandoah river the plan of operations which had been contemplated when we re-crossed the Potomac could not be put in execution, and before the water had subsided the movements of the enemy induced me to cross the Blue Ridge and take position south of the Rappahannock, which was accordingly done."

It is worthy to not that Gen. Lee gives no estimate of his losses. He says they were "severe," and embraced "an unusual proportion of distinguished and valuable officers," but he does not pretend to approximate the number of men killed, wounded and missing.

Upon the whole the report of Lee is tolerably candid, and as a part of the history of this bloody war directly affecting the Cumberland Valley, the material portions of it, as herewith given, will be read with more than ordinary interest by our people.

The voice of lamentation and mourning comes up from the dominions of Treason on every side. Maddened by temporary successes in the field, the foes of the government became insolent and relentless in their career of crime and their hearts were gladdened with the hope that they should rule the continent and doom Freedom to an early grave. But their season of joy and rejoicing has been changed for one of universal sorrow. Retribution seems to have smitten them in the field; in their usurped departments of power; in homes--everywhere, indeed, that the avenging hand of justice could bow them in humiliation and shame.

The late rebel papers are filled with curses upon their leaders and grief for the woes inflcited [sic] upon their people. The Richmond Sentinel is sad because the South is filled with "croakers and grumblers" who see no hope for the triumph of traitors, and it laments the "sufferings of the people." The Dispatch warns the bogus government and the people that the "distress from high prices" is now "the greatest danger to the Confederacy." The Whig is gloomy because of the fearful depreciation of rebel currency; and the Examiner also treats of the fabulous rates at which the commonest necessaries of life are held as the great peril that now threatens the existence of the traitors' government. The Sentinel, in denouncing the "croakers and grumblers" charges them with being the authors of the depreciation of the currency, and declares that "they seem to be laboring diligently" for the ruin of the rebel cause. It adds that they have but to sow the seeds of distrust among the soldiers, and "it needs no prophet to tell what will inevitably and speedily follow. Under the head of "Sufferings of the People," it relates instances of suffering among the widows of soldiers, and adds that "the curse of Heaven will be upon the land if these widows and their children are allowed to cry for bread in vain." The same paper calls Jeff. Davis to "tax the people high" and "suppress high prices by law!"

On the subject of the distress of the people, the Dispatch says:

"The rapid advance in all necessaries of clothing and subsistence threatens us with great distress. There is no disguising the fact. We cannot see how unemployed persons, and how those who live on incomes and salaries, are to get along, especially at the inclement season of the year now rapidly approaching. How are they to buy shoes and clothing at the present rates? Nay, how long are these rates to prevail? A great auction may in a day or two run them all up fifty per cent! An auction thus has become to be regarded by the people with as much dread as a battle! A defeat on the battle-field could hardly bring more suffering upon them. These questions are growing daily more and more important. Something must be done. Produce must be distributed, prices must be reduced, gains must be disgorged, or there will be suffering intense, and intense suffering will beget, what? Think of it."

The same paper deplores the new draft, and says:

"Already we are beginning to feel the want of labor in those employments that are indispensable to existence. What are the people to do this winter for clothing, fuel and for other prime necessities of tife [sic], if the few producers who are left are turned into consumers by being drafted into the army. Our most pressing danger is the immense privation and suffering our people may endure if the producing power is any further diminished."

In the extreme South and Southwest there is if possible still greater destitution and sorrow among the deluded people who in an evil hour gave themselves over to the crime of treason. When this causeless, wicked war was commenced by them, their land was teeming with wealth and plenty; but now by their own wanton rebellion against the government that gave them peace, protection and prosperity, they have spread a withering desolation over their own homes. Such are the fruits of treason in the South, and the only places where their wants are supplied and the general desolation measurably remedied, are where the Old Flag asserts its supremacy and gathers the people again under its protecting folds.

Capt. James M. Brown, of this place, has handed us the subjoined letter from Rev. T.V. Moore, formerly of Greencastle, but now of Richmond. He has visited our citizens who are held as prisoners in Richmond, and thus writes concerning them:

Richmond, Sept. 16, 1863.

Dear Sir: In accordance with your request in your letter of August 19th, I visited the nine citizens of Chambersburg here in prison. They are well, and say they are kindly treated and supplied with every thing they need. I loaned Mr. Culbertson some money, and took them to apply to me for anything they wanted. I will do all I can to make their situation as comfortable as possible, and will see them as often as I can. I applied to Judge Ould concerning their release. He said he had been trying to effect an arrangement with the U.S. Government by which non-combatants should not be imprisoned, and as soon as that was done, these men should be discharged. Perhaps if you were to get your Congressman, or other influential citizens to write to Washington, something might be done to put an end to this imprisonment of peaceful citizens on both sides. I have asked Judge Ould to put their names first, if possible, on the list of exchanges as soon as any thing can be done. I fervently hope that something may soon be done to this end, but in the meantime let their friends know that any thing in my power to promote their comfort will be done. If in any other way I can render you or any of my former friends in Pennsylvania any service, it will be done with great pleasure. Meanwhile I am

Very truly yours, T.V. Moore.

Mr. J.M. Brown, Chambersburg, Pa.